![]() ![]() Since every object of apprehension seems to be apprehended either through itself or through another object, by showing that nothing is apprehended either through itself or through another thing, they introduce doubt, as they suppose, about everything. They hand down also two other modes leading to suspension of judgement. Sextus Empiricus tells us there are two basic Pyrrhonian modes or tropes that lead the skeptic to suspension of judgment (ἐποχῆ): ![]() The problem of the infinite regress was a critical argument of the Skeptics in ancient philosophy. If the reasons count as knowledge, they must themselves be justified with reasons for the reasons, and so on, ad infinitum. So neither perception, Theaetetus, nor true opinion, nor reason or explanation combined with true opinion could be knowledge (epistéme). Socrates says:Īnd it is utterly silly, when we are looking for a definition of knowledge, to say that it is right opinion with knowledge, whether of difference or of anything else whatsoever. Indeed, the Theaetetus ends with Socrates' utter rejection of perception, true belief, or true belief combined with reasons or explanations as justification. Socratic dialogues normally did not reach any positive conclusions they were "negative dialectics." (δόξαν ἀληθῆ μετὰ λόγου ἐπιστήμην εἶναι) (202C)Īlthough "justified true belief" is the traditional philosophical definition of knowledge, still in use in modern positions on epistemology, the ancients were already skeptical of this Platonic idea. True opinion accompanied by reason is knowledge. Justification was providing some reasons (λόγος or συλλογισμῶ), a rational explanation for the belief. Plato in the Theaetetus (200D-201C) defined knowledge as justified true belief. Adolphe Quételet Jürgen Renn Juan Roederer Jerome Rothstein David Ruelle Tilman Sauerīiosemiotics Free Will Mental Causation James Symposium ![]()
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